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Abstract 
S o c i a l  psychologica l  and p e r s o n a l i t y  f a c t o r s  t h a t  can 
i n f l u e n c e  r e source  management on the  f l i g h t  deck a r e  
d iscussed .  It is  argued t h a t  p e r s o n a l i t y  and s i t u a t i o n a l  
f a c t o r s  i n t e r s e c t  t o  determine crew responses  and t h a t  
assessment of  performance under f u l l  crew and mission 
c o n d i t i o n s  can provide t h e  most va luab le  informat ion  about 
r e l e v a n t  f a c t o r s .  The p o s s i b i l i t y  of  t r a i n i n g  procedures t o  
improve performance on these dimensions is d iscussed .  
NASA resea rch  has developed a s t r o n g  case f o r  t h e  need t o  
understand and improve r e source  management on the f l i g h t  deck. 
Examination of  data from f u l l  miss ion  s imula t ions ,  as well as from 
t r a n s c r i p t s  of  acc iden t  r e p o r t s  and ASRS i n c i d e n t  r e p o r t s ,  convincingly 
documents how less than  opt imal  management and u t i l i z a t i o n  o f  human 
re sources  i n  t h e  cockp i t  can lead t o  d i s a s t r o u s  outcomes. Considering 
f l i g h t  crews as small groups,  a number of s o c i a l  psychologica 
can be i s o l a t e d  t h a t  are r e l e v a n t  t o  crew performance. These would 
ers group r e l a t i o n s ,  and communications 
ay t o  look  a t  e f l i g h t  deck from e r s p e c t i v e  
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of  a p e r s o n a l i t y  and s o c i a l  psychologis t  
Much o f  my own research over  t he  p a s t  15 y e a r s  has  d e a l t  w i t h  
s i t u a t i o n a l  and p e r s o n a l i t y  de te rminants  o f  crew performance under 
cond i t ions  of high stress. My research a c t i v i t i e s  have dea l t  l a r g e l y  
w i t h  t h e  Navy and NASA's space  program rather than  commercial a v i a t i o n ,  
but  I hope t o  argue convincingly t h a t  t h e  psychological  f a c t o r s  involved 
are h ighly  similar. 
By way of  p re face ,  I would l i k e  t o  say  a few words about  
psychology's c o n t r i b u t i o n  t o  understanding crew performance. Everyone, 
of course ,  is  aware of  t h e  c o n t r i b u t i o n  human f a c t o r s  research h a s  made 
t o  t e c h n i c a l  performance. P e r s o n a l i t y  psychology has  concent ra ted  on 
the  development o f  psychometric ins t ruments  f o r  personnel  s e l e c t i o n  and 
f o r  t he  p r e d i c t i o n  of  performance and/or  adjustment .  S o c i a l  psychology 
has  focused on group processes  r e l e v a n t  t o  i n d i v i d u a l  and crew 
performance. Before a t tempt ing  t o  argue t h a t  s o c i a l  and p e r s o n a l i t y  
psychology c o n t r i b u t e  t o  t h i s  area, it might be worthwhile t o  
explore  some o f  t h e  reasons  why i t  has n o t  been heav i ly  u t i l i z e d .  
One problem wi th  p e r s o n a l i t y  assessment has  been a s t r o n g  emphasis 
on screening  out  u n l i k e l y  or psychopathological  cand ida te s  rather than  
s e l e e t i n q  prospec ts  with opt imal  psychological  characteristics. Part 
of  t h e  problem comes from a l a c k  o f  consensus regard ing  j u s t  what an 
optimum psychological  p r o f i l e  c o n s i s t s  of .  Fu r the r ,  one must decide 
what the  cr i ter ia  f o r  v a l i d a t i o n  o f  s e l e c t i o n  procedures should be. 
Should one look a t  success fu l  l i n e  ope ra t ion  over  an extended per iod o r  
a t  performance i n  emergency s i t u a t i o n s ,  or a t  some weighted combination 
o f  these and o t h e r  measures? I w i l l  r e t u r n  30 the ques t ion  o f  r e a c t i o n s  
18 
i n  d i f f e r e n t  s i t u a t i o n s  later. 
S o c i a l  p sycho log i s t s ,  on the  o t h e r  hand, have tended t o  ignore  
p e r s o n a l i t y  v a r i a b l e s  and t o  concen t r a t e  on t i g h t l y  c o n t r o l l e d  
l a b o r a t o r y  experiments.  Such s t u d i e s  may have great s c i e n t i f i c  rigor, 
b u t  
such research t o  t h e  complexi t ies  of real world problems such as 
t h e  consumers of  research have r i g h t l y  quest ioned the  g e n e r a l i t y  of 
combat 
o r  a v i a t i o n .  
But perhaps the  most s e r i o u s  f a i l i n g  i n  our approach t o  complex 
problems of crew performance comes from ignor ing  the  f a c t  t h a t  behavior  
is  a func t ion  of  t h e  m r a c  tian of  p e r s o n a l i t y  and s i t u a t i o n a l  f a c t o r s .  
What mean i s  t h e  r e a l i z a t i o n  t h a t  behavior  i n  any g iven  s i t u a t i o n  i s  
J o i n t l y  determined by an i n d i v i d u a l ' s  p e r s o n a l i t y  and by the  o f  
t h e  s i t u a t i o n .  The p e r s o n a l i t y  type  a s soc ia t ed  w i t h  t h e  b e s t  
performance i n  one s e t t i n g  could be a s s o c i a t e d  with failure i n  another .  
As I have noted ,  p e r s o n a l i t y  psycho log i s t s  have concent ra ted  on 
p e r s o n a l i t y  typo log ie s  rather than  the impl i ca t ions  o f  p e r s o n a l i t y  types  
i n  a range of  s i t u a t i o n s  while s o c i a l  p sycho log i s t s  have been equa l ly  
c a v a l i e r  i n  ignor ing  t h e  impact of p e r s o n a l i t y  i n  s i t u a t i o n s ,  focusing 
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n a t u r e  
almost 
a s s o c i a t e d  wi th  behaviora l  outcomes. 
completely on spec i fy ing  the  aspects of t h e  p a r t i c u l a r  s i t u a t i o n  
Examination of the f i e l d  suggests t h a t  a hea l thy  awareness of these 
problems has developed along with much more sophisticated methodologies, 
t h a t  enable  the examination of complex s i t u a t i o n s  i n  a r igo rous  manner. 
Unfor tuna te ly ,  we have on ly  begun t o  demonstrate what we can do wi th  ou r  
newly-gained e x p e r t i s e .  I n  t h e  remainder of my p r e s e n t a t i o n ,  I w i l l  
d i s c u s s  some of the  p e r s o n a l i t y  and s i t u a t i a n a l  v a r i a b l e s  t h a t  I see as 
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c r u c i a l  f o r  r e source  management i n  a v i a t i o n .  As an aside,  l e t  me no te  
t h a t  I am aware o f  t h e  seve re  c o n s t r a i n t s  t h a t  o p e r a t e  on any l a r g e  
o rgan iza t ion  involved wi th  s e l e c t i o n  and maintenance o f  high l e v e l  
personnel .  The person with t h e  b e s t  psychologica l  p r o f i l e  may be 
d e f i c i e n t  p h y s i c a l l y  o r  may lack t e c h n i c a l  e x p e r t i s e  on any combination 
of t h e  above. Once selected,  a r i g i d  s e n i o r i t y  sys t em can over - r ide  
o t h e r  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  i n  crew composition, The cha l lenge  i s  t o  o b t a i n  
the  optimal outcome wi th in  these c o n s t r a i n t s .  
A large number of  p e r s o n a l i t y  dimensions have been s p e c i f i e d  
through research, many wi th  cons ide rab le  ove r l ap .  Obviously,  one must 
choose by some means the  subse t  of characterist ics deemed r e l e v a n t  t o  
t h e  s i t u a t i o n  a t  hand. I n  our research, w e  have begun wi th  performance 
and group adjustment  and have worked toward t h e  i s o l a t i o n  o f  r e l e v a n t  
t ra i t  c l u s t e r s .  L e t  me describe t h e  p o s s i b l e  imp l i ca t ions  o f  two t r a i t  
dimensions a c r o s s  s e v e r a l  hypo the t i ca l  s i t u a t i o n s .  We have found two 
dimensions t o  b e  s t r o n g l y  and widely related t o  group and i n d i v i d u a l  
r e a c t i o n s .  The first c l u s t e r  can be  called ins t rumen ta l  i t y  o r  g o a l  
o r i e n t a t i o n .  The second c l u s t e r  can be called e x m e s s  i v i t v  o r  group 
o r i e n t a t i o n .  Persons high on t h i s  dimension tend t o  be s e n s i t i v e  t o  t h e  
f e e l i n g s  of  o t h e r s  and i n t e r p e r s o n a l l y  warm. 
How t h e o r e t i c a l l y  should these dimensions relate t o  f l ight-deck 
performance? I n  r o u t i n e  f l y i n g  one would expec t  a moderate r e l a t i o n s h i p  
between performance and goal o r i e n t a t i o n  and a minimal r e l a t i o n s h i p  
between performance and group o r i e n t a t i o n .  One could p r e d i c t ,  however, 
t h a t  t hose  high i n  group o r i e n t a t i o n  would es tab l i sh  warmer and more 
e f f e c t i v e  working and personal  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  w i t h  a l l  co-workers. 
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I n  t h e  case o f  4 J l d i v i d W  performance i n  emergencies,  I would 
expect  t h e  h ighly  g o a l  o r i e n t e d  i n d i v i d u a l  t o  exce l .  I n  g e n e r a l ,  
i n s t r u m e n t a l i t y  would seem a good candida te  as a s e l e c t i o n  measure and 
e x p r e s s i v i t y  a n i c e ,  but  non-essent ia l  f a c t o r .  Va l ida t ion  using l i n e  
performance and s imula tor  performance i n  emergencies should v e r i f y  t h e  
re levance  o f  goa l  o r i e n t a t i o n  and t h e  lesser importance o f  group 
o r i e n t a t i o n .  
However, from t h e  pe r spec t ive  of  r e source  management and the  
conten t ion  t ha t  a s i g n i f i c a n t  propor t ion  of a c c i d e n t s  i nvo lves  a f a i l u r e  
t o  work op t ima l ly  as a team, a d i f f e r e n t  approach i s  suggested.  
Val ida t ion  o f  p r e d i c t o r s  o f  crew performance, t o  t h e  b e s t  o f  my 
knowledge, t y p i c a l l y  involve  a s ses s ing  t h e  r e a c t i o n s  o f  a 
complete crew dur ing  cond i t ions  o f  work overload o r  o t h e r  i n - f l i g h t  
crises. It is my t h e s i s  t h a t  v a l i d a t i o n  under these cond i t ions  might 
sugges t  a d i f f e r e n t  c o n s t e l l a t i o n  o f  opt imal  personal  characteristics. 
I would argue t h a t  when t o t a l  crew response t o  crisis is  the  
b e s t  outcome ( o p e r a t i o n a l l y  def ined  as opt imal  responses  t o  t he  
s i t u a t i o n  by a l l  crew members) might be  i n  crews where t h e  c a p t a i n  i n  
p a r t i c u l a r  was high i n  both g o a l  and group o r i e n t a t i o n .  Such 
i n d i v i d u a l s  might be  expected t o  be both competent i n  dealing with the  
t echn ica l  a s p e c t s  of t h e  problem a t tuned  t o  t h e  r e a c t i o n s  and 
performance o f  o t h e r s .  
examined, 
My i n t e r e s t  here is no t  t o  develop a n  argument f o r  t h e  adopt ion  of 
a new set  o f  p e r s o n a l i t y  measures, Rather, I am t r y i n g  t o  stress t h a t  
i f  t he  premise tha t  resource  management and a s s o c i a t e d  group performance 
are impor tan t  c o n t r i b u t i n g  f a c t o r s  t o  e f f i c i e n t  l i n e  ope ra t ion ,  then t h e  
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e v a l u a t i o n  o f  U d i v i d u  performance may f a i l  t o  cap tu re  t h e  c r u c i a l  
dimensions o f  crew behavior  i n  s t r e s s f u l  s i t u a t i o n s .  
I cannot  resist an  aside on t h e  p e r s o n a l i t y  i s s u e ,  however. I n  
d i scuss ing  r e source  management and f l i g h t  crew performance w i t h  a number 
o f  e x p e r t s ,  one o f  t h e  major p o i n t s  which emerged spontaneously was t h e  
"problem o f  t he  macho pi lot . I1  T h i s  has  a l s o  been an i s s u e  o f  some 
importance w i t h  a s t r o n a u t s ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  i n  t h e  r e luc t ance  t o  accept 
females and t o  s h i f t  t o  a d i f f e r e n t  mode o f  ope ra t ion  w i t h  t h e  space 
s h u t t l e .  I won't get  i n t o  t r y i n g  t o  d e f i n e  "macho" because I t h i n k  
d e f i n i t i o n s  o f  t h i s  type  o f  i n d i v i d u a l  are widely shared .  We have been 
concerned w i t h  t h i s  p e r s o n a l i t y  type  i n  our  research, e x p e c i a l l y  i n  
eva lua t ing  r e l a t i o n s  between the  sexes and t h e i r  r e l a t i o n  t o  
performance. S u f f i c e  i t  t o  s a y  t h a t  t h e  p e r s o n a l i t y  c o n s t e l l a t i o n  which 
most closely approximates t he  macho image i s  the  h ighly  instrumental- low 
express ive  one. 
Turning t o  more g e n e r a l  s o c i a l  psychological  f a c t o r s  which may 
i n f l u e n c e  crew performance, l e t  me first d e f i n e  t h e  s o c i a l  epvironment 
o f  t h e  f l i g h t  deck. Although the primary group o f  i n t e r e s t  c o n s i s t s  o f  
t h e  Capta in ,  F i r s t  Officer and F l i g h t  Engineer ,  t he  c r i t i ca l  s o c i a l  
network is  larger and more complex. I n  th ink ing  about s o c i a l  
i n t e r a c t i o n  i t  is  e s s e n t i a l  t o  inc lude  those  i n  vo ice  communication and 
i n t e r m i t t e n t  direct  con tac t .  Thus the  system should inc lude  A i r  Traffic 
C o n t r o l l e r s ,  Company Operat ions,  the  Cabin C r e w  and i n d i r e c t l y ,  t h e  
passengers .  
The A i r  Traffic C o n t r o l l e r  i s  a c e n t r a l  f i g u r e  i n  t h e  s o c i a l  
network and h i s  r o l e  i n  f l i g h t  deck ope ra t ion  should be considered.  For 
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example, take t h e  r e c e n t  s tudy  o f  p o t e n t i a l  a c c i d e n t s  by NASA around 
which there has  been cont roversy  (as w r i t t e n  up, for example, r e c e n t l y  
i n  &jsug 1. One i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  of  t h e  data i s  t h a t  there may be a 
greater r i s k  o f  c o l l i s i o n ,  as measured by i n c i d e n t  r e p o r t s ,  when under 
d i rec t  c o n t r o l .  Without becoming embroilpd i n  arguments about t h e  need 
f o r  c o n t r o l  and d i f f e r e n c e s  i n  r i s k  a t  va r ious  l o c a t i o n s ,  it seems worth 
not ing  t h a t  a l i n e  of s o c i a l  psychological  research would p r e d i c t  
decreased v i g i l e n c e  under p o s i t i v e  c o n t r o l .  Th i s  research has  t o  do 
w i t h  d i f f u s  i O r l  ef r e s D o n s i b i l i t e  . T h i s  series o f  i n v e s t i g a t i o n s  was 
s t imula ted  by t h e  observed phenomenon o f  i n d i v i d u a l s  failinn t o  take 
a c t i o n  i n  emergencies o r  r ede f in ing  t h e  s i t u a t i o n  a s  non-threatening 
when o t h e r s  are p resen t  and capable  of t ak ing  a c t i o n .  The most widely 
cited example is t h e  murder o f  K i t t y  Genovese o u t s i d e  her apartment.  
She was s tabbed r epea ted ly  over  a 30 minute per iod while  38 people 
watched and called the  p o l i c e ,  I n d i v i d u a l s  i n  such s i t u a t i o n s  may 
have a diminished sense  of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y ,  f e e l i n g ,  perhaps 
unconsciously,  t h a t  o t h e r s  w i l l  handle  t he  i n c i d e n t .  It is poss ib l e  
t h a t  being under p o s i t i v e  c o n t r o l  leads t o  reduced v i g i l a n c e  on the p a r t  
o f  crews, even though they  are f u l l y  aware of t he i r  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  
the  aircraft . 
Indeed, t h e  inc reas ing  automation o f  aircraft func t ions  may s e r v e  
the  undesired func t ion  o f  reducing t h e  crew's sense  o f  autonomy and 
personal  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y .  I n  a r e c e n t  i n t e rv i ew,  a s e n i o r  Captain made 
the  fo l lowing  comments: "We are t h e  best t r a i n e d  instrument  p i l o t s  i n  
t he  world, bu t  we're n o t  t r a i n i n g  t o  look o u t  t h e  window any more. It 's 
easy  t o  go cross-country on radar, and have somebody else do every th ing  
23 
f o r  you. 
f l y  the  p lane  as w e l l  as we do!" 
Sometimes we s a y  to  each o t h e r  up there t h a t  t h e  j a n i t o r  could 
I n  a similar v e i n ,  cons ide r  t h e  social psychologica l  r a m i f i c a t i o n s  
of  data from t h e  f u l l  miss ion  s imula t ion  s tudy  conducted by R u f f e l l  
Smi th .  The da t a  suggest a higher  error ra te  when a p a r t i c u l a r  
crewmember i s  i n  a s ta te  of  work overload.  I n  many cont inuing  abnormal 
s i t u a t i o n s  o r  emergencies, such as  engine  f a i l u r e ,  i n  a d d i t i o n  t o  
dea l ing  w i t h  t h e  o p e r a t i o n  o f  t he  a i rcraf t ,  i t  is necessary  t o  
coord ina te  t h e  a c t i o n s  o f  t h e  cab in  crew and t o  communicate w i t h  t he  
passengers .  I n  s e v e r a l  i n s t a n c e s ,  for example, t h e  assumption of 
c o n t r o l  of t h e  a i rc raf t  by t h e  Captain w h i l e  a t tempt ing  t o  make 
important  o v e r a l l  d e c i s i o n s  concerning t h e  f l i g h t  was associated w i t h  
s e r i o u s  e r r o r s .  
I f i n d  no reason  t o  ques t ion  t h e  a u t h e n t i c i t y  o f  these f i n d i n g s .  
Indeed, I would expect  such outcomes to  be more f r equen t  i n  emergencies 
du r ing  l i n e  o p e r a t i o n s  than  du r ing  s imula t ions  because of  t h e  o b j e c t i v e  
danger. 
What are some of t h e  imp l i ca t ions  of over load  on p i l o t s  dur ing  
non-routine f l y i n g  cond i t ions?  From a psychologica l  viewpoint ,  t he  
leader, decisionmaker i s  t h e  least a p p r o p r i a t e  person t o  be 
overburdened. Given tha t  research shows a narrowing of  pe rcep tua l  
a t t e n t i o n  under stress, one can argue t h a t  i t  is  probably n o t  op t imal  t o  
involve  t h e  Captain i n  mult i -processing a v a r i e t y  of tasks--such as 
f l y i n g  the  p lane ,  coord ina t ing  t h e  a c t i v i t i e s  of t h e  f l i g h t  and cab in  
crew, and making the  u l t i m a t e  d e c i s i o n s  regard ing  a c t i o n s  t o  be taken .  
It is l i k e l y  t ha t  t he  q u a l i t y  of each of these a c t i v i t i e s  w i l l  be 
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degraded i f  a l l  are undertaken simultaneously.  
Another psychological  f a c t o r  can add t o  t h e  burden on t h e  Captain.  
T h i s  is inc reased  dependency of crew members on t h e  Captain under 
stress. I n  ou r  research on groups under stress and i n  a number o f  o t h e r  
s t u d i e s ,  group members are seen  t o  become i n c r e a s i n g l y  dependent on t h e  
leader mder high stress cond i t ions .  Thus, t he  Captain is l i k e l y  t o  
bear a d d i t i o n a l  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  monitoring and d i r e c t i n g  t h e  
performance o f  t h e  crew. Conversely, by f a i l i n g  t o  monitor t h e  
r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  o f  o t h e r  crew members du r ing  the  c r i t i ca l  pe r iod ,  t he  
Captain may s e r i o u s l y  overload o t h e r  crew members. An example of t h e  
n e g a t i v e  effects o f  overload on t h e  f l i g h t  eng inee r  was n i c e l y  shown i n  
the  R u f f e l l  Smith s tudy.  
Along w i t h  i nc reased  dependency under stress, crew members may also 
experience a diminished sense  o f  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  i n  an emergency, p l ac ing  
more of the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  on t h e  l e a d e r s h i p  o f  t h e  Captain.  T h i s  could 
be i n t e n s i f i e d  i f  t h e  Captain r e l i e v e s  the  F i r s t  Officer o f  f l y i n g  
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y .  Indeed, t h e  e x e r c i s e  o f  l e a d e r s h i p  by the  Captain i n  
cr i t ical  s i t u a t i o n s  probably r e p r e s e n t s  a clear example o f  a p e r s o n a l i t y  
by s i t u a t i o n  i n t e r a c t i o n .  As an  hypothesized example, t h e  a u t h o r i t a r i a n  
type  o f  i n d i v i d u a l  may be g e n e r a l l y  d i s l i k e d  as a Captain i n  normal 
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opera t ions .  Such a n  i n d i v i d u a l  may, on the o t h e r  hand, t a k e  charge ve ry  
e f f e c t i v e l y  i n  emergencies and be well s u i t e d  t o  coping with t h e  
dependency of crew members. The d e m o c r a t i c , # s o c i a l l y  concerned leader 
might be h igh ly  valued du r ing  r o u t i n e  o p e r a t i o n s ,  b u t  f i n d  it more 
d i f f i c u l t  to  assume a s t r o n g  l e a d e r s h i p  r o l e  when t h e  s i t u a t i o n  demands 
it. It is p o s s i b l e  t h a t  s p e c i f i c  t r a i n i n g  i n  r o l e  performance conducted 
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with  groups under simula 
'ng and a h igh  d e n s i t y  o f  n 
t h a t  breakdowns i n  t h e  processing of  important  communications could p l a y  
a s i g n i f i c a n t  r o l e  i n  crew e r r o r s .  An important  t a s k  o f  t h e  Captain 
would appea r  t o  be  maintaining c l o s e  supe rv i s ion  o f  a l l  communications, 
e l imina t ing  unnecessary communications and ensur ing  t h a t  a l l  c r i t i ca l  
data are understood. T h i s  i s  obviously an i m p l i c i t  p a r t  o f  t h e  
Cap ta in ' s  r o l e ,  bu t  I would b e t  a tank  o f  gas t h a t  a s i g n i f i c a n t  number 
of communication breakdowns can be  observed under h igh  workload and 
emergency s i t u a t i o n s .  . 
Another type  o f  pe r son- s i tua t ion  i n t e r a c t i o n  t h a t  I t h i n k  is  l i k e l y  
t o  emerge concerns s i t u a t i o n s  involv ing  crews with a female member. 
From my own research assessing t h e  performance o f  women i n  demanding 
r o l e s  under high stress, 1 have every reason  to b e l i e v e  t h a t  t he  
ind iv idua l  performance o f  female f l i g h t  crew members w i l l  be equal  t o  
e competence o f  females, 
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f u r t h e r  work overloads.  I n  t h e  case o f  a female Captain,  t he  j u n i o r  
male crew may a t tempt  t o  usurp  t h e  Capta in ' s  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s .  If t h i s  
sounds far-fetched, i t  can be pointed o u t  t h a t  such occurrences  were 
noted among s e v e r a l  all-male crews i n  t h e  R u f f e l l  Smith s tudy .  A 
similar complaint about  a t  tempted take-over o f  Cap ta in ' s  
r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  by a very  s e n i o r  F i r s t  Officer can be found i n  t h e  ASRS 
r e p o r t s .  I n  any even t ,  I would a rgue  t h a t  as women become more widely 
i n t e g r a t e d  i n t o  crews, t h e  ques t ion  o f  crew coord ina t ion  under s t r e s s f u l  
cond i t ions  should be i n v e s t i g a t e d  w i t h  high p r i o r i t y .  Our f r i e n d  the  
"macho p i l o t "  is l i k e l y  t o  p lay  t h e  p i v o t a l  ro le  i n  such scena r ios .  The 
fol lowing r e l e v a n t  views were a t t r i b u t e d  t o  a p i l o t  i n  a r e c e n t  s t o r y  i n  
t h e  Washington Post. "He d i d  say  t h a t  even though t h e  men p i l o t s  don ' t  
s l ande r  t h e i r  female co-workers when f l y i n g ,  most would rather n o t  f l y  
w i t h  a woman. He added t h a t  being a p i l o t  c a l l s  f o r  and a t t racts  a very  
powerful,  i f  no t  'macho' , per sona l i ty . "  
On a more nega t ive  n o t e ,  I would l i k e  t o  mention a l i n e  o f  research 
t h a t  has been q u i t e  i n f l u e n t i a l  i n  o rgan iza t ions .  T h i s  i s  t h e  
examination o f  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  between group cohes iveness  (de f ined  as 
the  mutual a t t r a c t i o n  of group members and the i r  sense  of group 
membership) and performance. I n  g e n e r a l ,  it has been noted t h a t  h igh ly  
cohes ive  crews also show s u p e r i o r  performance. Th i s  has  l e d  t o  a number 
o f  a t t empt s  i n  o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  settings t o  i n s t i t u t e  t r a i n i n g  programs t o  
improve group climate and cohesiveness  w i t h  the  assumption tha t  improved 
group r e l a t i o n s  w i l l  lead t o  improved performance. The r e s u l t s  have 
been d i s t i n c t l y  mixed. Our research wi th  well-motivated p ro fes s iona l  
crews ( i n  t h i s  case wi th  Aquanauts working underwater i n  a ve ry  
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s t r u c t u r e d  environment dur ing  P r o j e c t  T e k t i t e )  sugges t s  a rather 
d i f f e r e n t  sequence o f  courses .  I n  looking a t  performance and group 
climate over extended pe r iods  o f  time we found t h a t  p o s i t i v e  changes i n  
crew performance l e d  t o  more group cohesiveness  while  p o s i t i v e  changes 
i n  cohesiveness  had 1 1 ~  i n f luence  on performance. T h i s  sugges t s  t h a t  
many t r a i n i n g  programs have been dea l ing  w i t h  effects  rather than  
causes .  I n  o t h e r  words, t r a i n i n g  e f f o r t s  could more p r o f i t a b l y  be 
directed toward f a c i l i t a t i n g  group performance, 'in which case group 
r e l a t i o n s  should be  q u i t e  good. A part  of such t r a i n i n g  might i nc lude  
emphas is  on how p e r s o n a l i t y  types  in f luence  group performance i n  
d i f f e r e n t  t ypes  of  s i t u a t i o n s .  
I have only  touched on a few i n s t a n c e s  where I feel  s o c i a l  
psychological  f a c t o r s  may have a s i g n i f i c a n t  impact on f l i g h t  deck 
performance. I fee l  s t r o n g l y ,  though, t h a t  a case i s  developing f o r  t h e  
importance o f  human re source  management f o r  s a f e t y  i n  f l i g h t  ope ra t ions .  
I would sugges t  t h a t  a two-t iered approach t o  t h e  i s s u e  might b e  
op t imal ,  
F i r s t ,  I feel t h a t  a d d i t i o n a l  data on the  in f luence  o f  s o c i a l  
f a c t o r s  on performance dur ing  work overload and emergency s i t u a t i o n s  are 
needed. Cont ro l led  data o f  t h i s  s o r t  can b e s t  be obta ined  during f u l l  
mission s imula t ions .  However, an important  a d d i t i o n a l  sou rce  o f  data 
would be t h e  s o c i a l  psychological  a n a l y s i s  of cockp i t  and f l i g h t  
recorder data from a c c i d e n t s  where NTSB i n v e s t i g a t i o n  has  concluded t h a t  
crew e r r o r  has played a s i g n i f i c a n t  part.. 
Assuming t h a t  unequivocal evidence can be amassed showing 
decrements i n  performance and less than  opt imal  r e a c t i o n s  t o  abnormal 
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s i t u a t i o n s  as a func t ion  o f  s o c i a l  psychological  f a c t o r s ,  i t  should be 
q u i t e  feasible t o  develop t r a i n i n g  procedures  t o  h e l p  crews cope wi th  
such  s i t u a t i o n s  more e f f e c t i v e l y  and even t o  improve pe r son / s i tua t ion  
f i t .  I n  my opin ion ,  mission s imula t ions  w i t h  ex tens ive  c r i t i q u e s  o f  
group as w e l l  as i n d i v i d u a l  performance would be t h e  most impact fu l  
means o f  implementing t h i s .  I a l s o  b e l i e v e  t h a t  h ighly  e f f e c t i v e  
t r a i n i n g  tapes could b e  developed h i g h l i g h t i n g  t h e  types  of: d e l e t e r i o u s  
r e source  management i s o l a t e d  i n  such research. 
A s  a f i n a l  no te ,  I would stress t h a t  from a s o c i a l  p sycho log i s t ' s  
viewpoint ,  a program i n  r e source  management w i l l  on ly  be success fu l  i f  
i t  is apparent  t o  l i n e  personnel  t h a t  i t  has t h e  complete and 
unequivocal suppor t  of  management. The implementation o f  such a s h i f t  
i n  t r a i n i n g  mus t  a l s o  b e  done wi th  some d e l i c a c y  regard ing  the  
self- images .of  crew members. I t h i n k  an example from t h e  merchant 
marine is h igh ly  i n s t r u c t i v e .  One o f  t h e  major o i l  companies which 
o p e r a t e s  a large t anke r  f leet  d i d  a c a r e f u l  a n a l y s i s  o f  Capta in ' s  d u t i e s  
and concluded t h a t  t h e  Capta in ' s  j ob  d e f i n i t i o n  r e a l l y  c o n s i s t s  
p r imar i ly  o f  t h e  management of complex resources ;  both human and 
material. It was t h e r e f o r e  decided t h a t  t h e  job  d e s c r i p t i o n  should 
ref lect  t h i s .  Accordingly,  a l l  of t h e  f leet  c a p t a i n s  were informed 
t h a t ,  e f f e c t i v e  immediately,  t hey  were no longe r  Capta ins  o f  t h e i r  
v e s s e l s  bu t  i n s t e a d  were Shipboard Managers. Somewhat t o  management's 
s u r p r i s e ,  the  r e a c t i o n s  o f  these managers was d i s t i n c t l y  h o s t i l e .  Their  
t i t l e  somehow failed t o  c a p t u r e  t he  image o f  s a l t - sp ray  and r o l l i n g  seas 
which they  had s p e n t  yea r s  acqu i r ing .  
I doubt i f  t he  t i t l e  Aircraft Manager would f i n d  much acceptance 
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among your Capta ins  even though it may re f lec t  t h e  r e a l i t y  of  today ' s  
ope ra t ions .  On t h e  o t h e r  hand, I feel  t h a t  conc re t e  demonstrat ions o f  
t h e  need f o r  crew coord ina t ion  and c a r e f u l  management of  resources  w i l l  
lead t o  r a p i d  acceptance o f  t h e  concept .  The R u f f e l l  Smith s tudy  
provides  a good s t a r t i n g  poin t .  The very f avorab le  r e a c t i o n s  of  t he  
crews involved sugges t  t h a t  awareness o f  a problem area can come r a p i d l y  
under t h e  proper cond i t ions .  
Our case is n o t  proven, but  I hope t h a t  time w i l l  bear out  t h e  
importance of d e a l i n g  w i t h  s o c i a l  psychological  f a c t o r s  on t h e  f l i g h t  
deck. I fee l  t h a t  we can demonstrate q u i t e  conclus ive ly  t h a t  a 
s i g n i f i c a n t  c o n t r i b u t i o n  can be made t o  your ope ra t ions .  If we convince 
you o f  t h i s ,  s o c i a l  psychology can assume a p lace  as a s i g n i f i c a n t  
resource  i n  commeroial a v i a t i o n .  
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